I am a Ph.D. student of Economics at Goethe University Frankfurt am Main. I am working as a research assistant in the chair of Banking and Finance since August 2016.
My research interests are in the areas of textual analysis of corporate communications and empirical banking. I also have a deep interest in computer programming; I have experiences in teaching programming, and also acquired knowledge about machine learning methods as I need them for my research where I work a lot with texts and using text mining tools.
I have a bachelor in Petroleum Engineering from Sharif University of Technology, Tehran.
I am from Iran and I was born in Sabzevar -a historical and beautiful small city in the North-East of Iran on September 11th, 1991.
Abstract: We develop a linguistic measure for not providing information in a question and answer setup using a Multinominal Inverse Regression (MNIR) technique. We show that our dictionary has economic relevance by applying it to contemporaneous stock market reactions after earnings conference calls. Obstructing the flow of information leads to significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns following an earnings call, both across CEOs and within CEOs over time. Our metric is designed to be of general applicability for Q&A situations, and hence, can be applied outside the contextual domain of earnings conference calls.
Abstract: We analyze how senior managements' willingness to orally convey information in earnings calls affects firms' stock returns. Using a novel metric for management blathering derived by textual analysis, we show that the market punishes blathering managers, i.e. a lack of factual content in answering to investors questions. Firms, in which managers blather more, experience significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns following their earnings calls. This result corresponds to the `Obfuscation Hypothesis', which postulates that blathering increases the perceived noise of a message and, in turn, uncertainty among investors. Further, we document that blathering is particularly pronounced when earnings management is more likely, which suggests that blathering might be used as an instrument to obfuscate earnings management.
Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the role of corporate culture in banking. We define culture based on the Competing Value Framework (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) and find that banks with a more pronounced competition-oriented culture have stronger bonus-focussed compensation schemes, while banks with a strong focus on creativity show higher bankruptcy risk. These findings suggest that risk management practices are not merely driven by incentives from compensation schemes, but rather driven by differences in corporate culture.
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